DePaul Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Winter 1976

Article 8

Environmental Law - The Uneasy Accommodation between State
and Federal Agencies
George E. Bullwinkel

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
George E. Bullwinkel, Environmental Law - The Uneasy Accommodation between State and Federal
Agencies, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 423 (1976)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol25/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information,
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE UNEASY
ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL AGENCIES
George E. Bullwinkel*
While Illinois was one of the first states to enact a comprehensive system of environmental statutes and regulations,the federal government has been progressing rapidly, and has even
taken the lead in several important areas. This Article explores
the rapidly changing relationship between state and federal environmental regulatory and enforcement programs, focusing on
the actual and potential conflicts between state and federal
agencies which have been avoided, or at least postponed,
through mutual cooperation. In addition, it examines the specific procedures which are used by the respective agencies in
enforcing environmental legislation.

Illinois environmental law emerged from its adolescence in
July, 1970, with the passage of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act of 1970' (the Illinois Act). Prior to this legislation,
pollution control in Illinois, if not of the common law nuisance
variety, was relegated to a variety of boards and agencies having
uncertain jurisdictions, confusing standards, and a motivation for
the task which was questionable at best.2
The Illinois Act ambitiously launched a trio of new institutions:
the Pollution Control Board (the Board), the Environmental Protection Agency (the Agency) and the Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality.3 As most industries and their lawyers are now
aware, the Board sits both as a legislative, rule-making body for
the consideration and adoption of regulations, and as an adjudicatory tribunal for granting variances and dealing with violations.
* Partner, Keck, Cushman, Mahin & Cate, Chicago, Illinois. The author acknowledges
with appreciation the many hours of discussion and assistance generously provided by
attorneys for the various environmental agencies discussed herein, including Ronald J.
Ganim, David A. Ullrich, Jeff R. Diver, Delbert Haschemeyer, and Richard W. Cosby,
among others.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,§§ 1001-51 (1973).
2. See Klein, Pollution Control in Illinois-The Formative Years, 22 DEPAUL L. REV.
759, 759-60 (1973).

3.

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 111 1/2,§§ 1004-06 (1973).
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The Agency issues construction and operating permits and enforces the Act and the rules through the investigation and prosecution of violations before the Board. The third body, the Institute for Environmental Quality, furnishes technical backup to
both the Board and the Agency. 4
The Board viewed rule-making as its first priority in 1970 and
promptly set forth to catalog into a single, comprehensive set of
regulations the vast array of emissions which emanate from the
everyday activities of Illinois citizens and industries. But at the
same time that the Board was filling its docket with rule-making
proceedings, it was lamenting its lack of adjudicatory matters
involving enforcement actions, variances, and appeals from permit denials.'
One method of enforcement was soon obviated when the Board
learned that it was without power to impose monetary penalties
as a condition of granting a variance. 7 Its appetite for enforcement, however, remained undiminished.' When the Board ended
its second full year in June, 1972, it had assessed $422,861.96 in
penalties; a figure equal to about half of its own operating
budget.' Since fiscal 1972, however, the Board's overall importance as an instrument of enforcement seems to have declined. 0
4. For a general discussion of these three institutions see Klein, supra note 2, at 76164.
5. See generally, 2 ILL. POLLUTION CONTROL BD. ANN. REP. (1971).
6. Unfortunately, the result of our policy of dismissing insufficient petitions
for variance has been that the cases tend not to be refiled; may disappear, and
we do not get to establish a timetable for compliance. An Agency complaint
could clearly be in order in such cases. But in light of the present importance
of variance cases as enforcement tools, we cannot afford to lose so many cases,
so our policy recently has been to overlook pleading deficiencies wherever possible and to call to the parties' attention the additional elements that must be
proved at hearing.
Id. at 12.
7. Citizens Util. Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 9 Ill.App.3d 158, 289 N.E.2d 642 (2d Dist.
1972).
8. The Board's largest attempted penalty was levied in April, 1971 against GAF Corporation, a Joliet roofing manufacturer that had missed deadlines in completing its wastewater treatment facilities. The original penalty of $149,000 was vacated and a new fine of
$50,000 assessed in September, 1972. GAF Corp. v. EPA, #71-11, 5 PCB 525 (October 3,
1972).
9. 4 ILL. POLLUTION CONTROL BD. ANN. REP. 16 (1974).
10. Several cases have been sent back to the Board by the courts for redetermination
of penalty, with the clear implication that punitive penalties were neither necessary nor
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The pattern of adjudicatory matters before the Board reflects
this trend. Enforcement cases, which can be brought by either the
Agency or interested citizens, 1 have never matched the 1972 record level of 209 cases. Only 140 cases were tried in 1973, 132 cases
in 1974, and 173 cases in 1975. More dramatically, total penalties
assessed in fiscal year 1975 (ending June 30, 1975) were
$247,323.60, or only 58 percent of the fiscal 1972 bench mark."2
The cause of this apparent decline in enforcement activity before the Board is not entirely attributable to a contagion of compliance 'among polluters, nor to the reluctance of the Agency to
prosecute." Under a grudging 1971 agreement between the
Agency and the Illinois Attorney General, all enforcement actions
must be initiated by a referral from the Agency to the attorney
general, who then files the case on the Agency's behalf." The
interposition of the attorney general between the Agency and the
Board supposedly screens out the Agency's less well-prepared

cases.

15

In light of this agreement the Agency itself also carries out a
proper to carry out the purpose of the Act. See Southern Ill. Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 60 111. 2d 204, 326 N.E.2d 406 (1975); City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control
Bd., 57 Ill.2d 482, 313 N.E.2d 161 (1974); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 24
Ill.App.3d 203, 321 N.E.2d 58 (3d Dist. 1975). The Board must take into account the
considerations in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. il /2,§ 1033(c) (1973) in making any penalty
determinations. Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Ill. 2d 290, 319 N.E.2d 794
(1975).
§ 1031(b) (1973) provides that any person may file a
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
complaint meeting the same statutory requirements imposed on the Agency, and unless
the Board determines that the complaint is "duplicitous or frivolous" it must schedule
the hearing and conduct further proceedings in the same way as if the Agency had been
the complainant.

12. 5

ILL. POLLUTION CONTROL

BD. ANN.

REP.

(unpublished draft, 1975). Fiscal 1976,

however, has started with a flurry of new enforcement activity, principally against defendants who have persistently failed to secure operating permits.
13. Prosecutorial discretion, however, does play a significant role in the Agency's enforcement procedure. See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
14. This is in contrast to appearances by the Agency as respondent in variance requests
and appeals of permit denial, where the Agency still appears in its own behalf with its
own staff attorneys as counsel. The merits of this arrangement with the attorney general
are set forth in Immel, Pollution Control in Illinois-The Role of the Attorney General,
23 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 967-72 (1974). But see Klein, supra note 2, at 772-74.
15. The attorney general, on the other hand, can and will take a case to the Board or
the courts without so much as a by-your-leave from the Agency, usually in connection with
a case of significant public interest. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 12 (1973). See People v. Inland
Steel Co., Docket No. 71CH259 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Sept. 8, 1975).
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screening process, perhaps, in some cases, contrary to the apparently mandatory provisions of the Act. Section 31(a) of the Illinois Act provides that if its investigation discloses that a violation
may exist, the Agency shall issue a written notice and formal
complaint calling for a hearing before the Board.'" Read literally,
the Agency would seem to have a non-discretionary duty to initiate enforcement proceedings whenever it suspects or surmises
that a violation has occurred. As a practical matter, however, the
Agency presently ignores the mandatory provisions of section
31(a) of the Illinois Act and tries to refer to the attorney general
only cases which it believes to be thoroughly investigated and
backed up with solid evidence.
AIR-STATE PROGRAMS, BUT FEDERAL LIMITS

During the same period in which Illinois was developing its
system for environmental protection, Congress and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) worked to produce a wholly new legislative structure to deal with the majority
of states which, unlike Illinois, needed strong federal incentives
to speed the awakening of their environmental consciences. The
effect of these federal requirements on both the structure and
inner workings of the Illinois system has been significant.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970'1 set up a complicated
program for attainment of nationally imposed primary and secondary air quality standards within a fixed time after the submission of approvable state implementation plans (SIP's).18 In addition, EPA was simultaneously considering and promulgating its
own standards of performance for certain classes of air emission
sources as required by the Clean Air Act," which could be delegated to the states for enforcement.2"
Illinois submitted its implementation plan and in due course
it was approved by the Administrator on May 31, 1972.1 Illinois
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1 , § 1031(a) (1973).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970).
18. Id. § 1857c-5. See Comment, State Implementation Plans and Air Quality
Enforcement, 4 ECOLOGY L. Q. 595 (1975).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6 to c-7 (1970).
20. Id.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 52.722 (1974). Although it is now probably moot, there was at one time

1976]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

then had three years, or until May 31, 1975, to achieve those
standards.2 Strictly interpreted, any amendment to a state SIP
has to be submitted to EPA for approval; otherwise the original
provisions prevail. 3 A source, therefore, may have applied for and
been granted a state variance, but still be subject to enforcement
under the federally enforceable SIP. Such a result might occur if
EPA did not agree with a state's action in granting the variance,
24
or if a citizen chose to initiate such a case on his own.
What has happened in the case of the Illinois SIP has been
something short of literal compliance with the Clean Air Act. A
number of project completion schedules were initially submitted
and published as SIP revisions,2 5 but since that time the Board's
considerable work in hearing and granting variance requests has
been reported to EPA only sporadically; without the formality of
a communication from the governor, as is required for an SIP
amendment.2 6 Even in instances where the Agency informally

reported its variance proceedings to EPA, the Agency's letters
have simply accumulated on a desk at EPA Region V headquarters. Since the Board had taken the position that no variance
could extend past the federally required compliance date of May
31, 1975, EPA assumed that the issue of variances acting as SIP
amendments would become moot on that date. It did not. Indeed,
the matter has taken on new significance since the Supreme
Court decision in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
some question as to whether the Illinois SIP applicable to Chicago had ever been approved
at all. With the passage of the attainment date of May 31, 1975, the issue has apparently
not been raised. In light of Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60
(1975), allowing variances which will not interfere with attainment or maintenance of the
federal air quality standard, the issue may never come up.
Any appeal of the federal approval of the Illinois SIP had to be filed within 30 days after
such approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970); Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d
925 (7th Cir. 1974). If the issue becomes unappealable it may possibly be raised as a
defense to an enforcement action. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.
1975).
22. Certain revisions to the Illinois SIP were submitted in 1973 in the form of compliance schedules for a number of particular emission sources, none of which had completion
schedules effectively greater than the three year attainment period provided by federal
law. 39 Fed. Reg. 28155 (1974).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3)(1970).
24. Id. § 1857h-2(a).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(1)(1970).
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Inc. ,27 holding that states can now grant variances past their federally required attainment dates if the variances in question do
not interfere with the attainment and maintenance of federal
minimum standards. Revised federal regulations for the approval
of such variances have been proposed but not yet promulgated.28
EPA's Enforcement Procedures
Federal air enforcement procedure is simple and direct. The
Clean Air Act authorizes a very powerful tool called, in EPA
jargon, a "Section 114 letter."" With such a letter an EPA
attorney-engineer team can require the source to test its emissions and supply up-to-date data, which may differ from the data
in the file of the state agency. If the source refuses, the refusal
itself becomes a ground for prosecution. Region V has sent
hundreds of Section 114 letters in the last three years.
If the response to the Section 114 letter appears to show a
violation of federally enforceable state regulations, a Section 113
Notice of Violation" is sent. The accused violator must then be
offered a conference to discuss all relevant facts in his case.,, EPA
takes the leading role in this procedure, although the appropriate
state agencies are invited to, and usually do, attend. Region V has
had such conferences in all cases except where waived pursuant
to an agreed settlement and order. Most of the Region V cases
resulting from Section 113 violation notices have ultimately been
resolved by the issuance of an agreed compliance order which has
the appearance, if not the effect, of a federal variance.
If the conference does not result in an acceptable compliance
program, the EPA attorney-engineer team may either
recommend that the Regional Administrator issue a formal order
requiring the source to meet a given timetable of compliance, or
go directly to federal court. If an order is issued by EPA and
violated, litigation may also follow. A formal litigation report
including all facts, law, possible defenses and the position of the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

421 U.S. 60 (1975).
40 Fed. Reg. 21046 (1975); id. at 14876.
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(a)(1970).
Id. § 1857c-8(a)(1).
Id. § 1857c-8(a)(4).
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appropriate state agency is prepared and sent on a roundabout
journey, starting with the EPA regional director, and then to EPA
in Washington where it is reviewed and turned over to the Department of Justice. If approval is encountered at each stage,
then the prosecution is initiated by the United States Attorney,
usually where the violation occurred.
WATER-A FEDERAL PROGRAM FOR STATE ADMINISTRATION

Not satisfied with its previous water legislation, Congress
wiped the books almost clean in 1972 by enacting the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19722 (FWPCA).
This legislation broke new ground by setting specific goals of
waste treatment to be met by all industries by clearly defined
dates. Rather than giving states an arbitrary length of time to
meet the new treatment standards after approval of implementation plans, as in the Clean Air Act, the FWPCA flatly stated that
effluent dischargers must achieve the "best practicable control
technology currently available" by July 1, 1977, and "the best
available technology economically achievable" by July 1, 1983,11
with the latter intended to eventually result in "the national goal
of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants."'" To this end each
state was required to submit an approvable designation of water
quality standards.3 5 EPA, for its part, was required to develop and
publish national standards of performance applicable to (1) specified categories of new sources,'3 (2) toxic waste effluents," and
(3) facilities for pretreatment of sewage prior to discharge into
publicly owned treatment works.36 As for existing facilities, EPA
was obliged to issue guidelines for methods of controlling pollution from existing sources.3" EPA is progressing toward completion of most of its congressionally dictated tasks. Its performance
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 111, 1973), amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-65 (1970).
33. Id. § 1311(b).
34. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
35. Id. § 1313(a).
36. Id. § 1316(b).
37. Id. § 1317(a).
38. Id. § 1317(b).
39. Id. § 1314(b).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:423

standards, effluent standards and guidelines stand superimposed
upon existing Illinois regulations as "do-not-exceed" limitations
for industrial discharges."
The vehicle for enforcement of the FWPCA, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 4 ' intends to take
the place of the ancient and sporadically enforced "Refuse Act." 4
While NPDES may have filled a regulatory vacuum in many
states, the space was already occupied in Illinois. In contrast to
EPA's air e-mission standards, which could be engrafted upon
existing regulations by familiar Board procedures of public notice, hearing and enactment,43 NPDES required the promulgation
of new substantive discharge regulations and interfered with the
state permit procedure as well.
The economics of federal monetary assistance make the imposition of these federal requirements difficult to decline. 4 Whereas
federal disapproval of a state plan designed to achieve air quality
standards may result in the unilateral promulgation of a federal
implementation plan, the state may in theory refuse to go along.45
This leaves EPA with the job of policing its own regulations; a
task which it has shown itself to be ill-equipped to handle. 6
40. In theory, the guidelines for existing sources could be exceeded in an appropriate
case but given the apparent attitude of EPA, a discharge permit containing such relaxed
restrictions could not be issued. In practice, dischargers capable of doing better than the
guidelines are required to maintain at least the same degree of performance.
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)-(k) (Supp. 111, 1973). See Freeborn, Illinois Environmental
Law-The New Assault on Water Pollution, 24 DEPAuL L. REV. 481, 494-98 (1975).
42. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Enforcement under this
act was suspended until December 31, 1975. Id. § 1342(k) (Supp. In, 1973). Now that this
suspension is expired, prosecution under the Refuse Act is again possible, including qui
tam suits by citizens claiming a share of the informer's fee.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
§§ 1026-29 (1973).
44. Cooperation with the Clean Air Act and NPDES programs brings with it substantial
federal money for the operation of state pollution control programs. In Illinois, the expected Agency budget for fiscal year 1976 will include about 50 percent federal money for
the air program and nearly 25 percent for the water program, not to mention the $1.8
billion in federal grants for water treatment plant construction.
45. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 8 ERC 1105 (4th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v.
Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975); Arizona
v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 256 n.17
(3d Cir. 1974).
46. In California, for example, EPA had ordered, inter alia, restrictions on gasoline sales
and vehicle registrations, ordered retrofit of catalysts into existing cars, and banned operation of motorcycles during daylight hours in certain months. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.241-.245
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Statutory changes reflecting NPDES requirements were enacted by the Illinois legislature in 1973, and the Board promptly
enacted what it hoped would be suitable regulations. The Agency
will be unable, however, to take over the granting of NPDES
permits until formal approval by EPA and the filing of an appropriate letter of authority with the Illinois Secretary of State.,'
The federal engine, driving the NPDES program in Illinois, is
located in EPA's Region V Chicago headquarters, which has responsibility for the states of Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota and Ohio. Region V has thus far issued approximately 11,000 NPDES permits in these states. Federal permit
regulations under FWPCA provide an appeal procedure commencing with an adjudicatory hearing before an EPA law judge
appointed by the Administrator48 and thereafter proceeding to the
Regional Administrator for initial decision, possible appeal to the
Administrator in Washington, and then directly to the United
States Court of Appeals on the record generated at the hearing.49
Of these 11,000 permits, less than 400 appeals have been lodged
with EPA, and of these only about 150 are presently active from
Illinois and Indiana dischargers.
It is astonishing that only two of the perhaps 250 appeals that
have been resolved thus far by Region V have actually resulted
in a hearing before a law judge.50 The rest have been negotiated
to a conclusion which was at least sufficiently satisfactory to the
discharger so that the discharger agreed to dismiss the petition
for review. It is difficult to tell who relented. Many requests for
adjudicatory hearing result from minor disputes as to procedural
matters, arithmetic errors in conversion from one system of units
to another, and conflicting reporting schedules.
More basic disputes such as the technical validity of discharge
(1974). EPA unsuccessfully argued that it could force California to comply by injunction
or by holding state officials in civil contempt. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. State of IllinoisPollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3 (Water Pollution), Rule
916. When this will happen depends on the resolution of the present deadlock between
the Agency and EPA on the final authority of EPA to veto a given NPDES permit. See
text accompanying notes 55-57 infra.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 125.36 (1975).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. I1, 1973).
50. U.S. Steel Gary Works, NPDES-V-027(AH); American Can Co., NPDES-V001(AH).
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limitations and water quality standards for receiving waters are
regarded by EPA, and its law judges, as beyond the scope of its
hearing jurisdiction. EPA has taken the position that new source
effluent standards and water quality standards must be challenged, if at all, within 90 days of promulgation." Whether this
appeal limitation applies to the guidelines for existing sources
seems questionable, but a discharger might choose to challenge
these in the district courts under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.5" A similar provision requiring immediate
challenge to the validity of state regulations is contained in the
53
Illinois Act.
The Illinois Agency takes credit for drafting the effluent limits
in each of the approximately 2,500 candidates for NPDES permits in the state. The Board's effluent regulations have been
consistently applied except where the applicable federal limitation or guideline is more restrictive, in which case the federal
limit has been used. If the application of these minimum standards still does not result in achievement of federally approved
water quality standards for the receiving body of water, the
Agency plans to allocate shares of the allowable effluent load
among the affected dischargers.
When present work on Illinois basin planning is finished 14
river basins in Illinois will be identified and classified according
to segments. Other allocation situations may eventually be encountered. This is particularly true for certain problem pollutants
including total suspended solids, total dissolved solids, phosphorus, iron and pH. The present first round of NPDES permits will
not reflect such future allocation requirements, but both EPA
and the Agency contemplate that when these permits come up for
renewal in five years,54 stricter standards will be applied which,
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. 111, 1973).
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76 (1970). See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir.
1975). There is some authority to support the right to challenge such regulations at the
enforcement stage. See Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. EPA, 8 ERC 1207 (7th Cir. 1975); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 '/2, § 1041 (1973).
54. NPDES permits can embody variances from state standards for up to five years.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(b) (Supp. 111, 1973). Illinois law provides for a five year variance
for water, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1036(b) (1973), and has recently been amended to
allow a five year variance for air, P.A. 79-1064 (Sept. 22, 1975), amending ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 111 , 8 1036(b) (1973).
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at least in theory, will allow consideration of projected population
increases and eventual achievement of the 1983 FWPCA water
quality standards.
Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Minnesota and Indiana (all of the
Region V states except Illinois) have at this writing been granted
authority to issue NPDES permits. EPA has in each instance,
however, retained the right to approve prior to issuance, which is
in effect a veto power.55 It is this issue that is the bone of contention between Illinois and EPA on finally turning over NPDES
authority to the Agency. Illinois is unlike any other state in the
Region V group in that it has a detailed and finely balanced
review process which provides for an administrative hearing and
making of a record before the Board, and judicial review in the
appellate court, and conceivably, in the Illinois Supreme Court.
One can imagine the consternation that would follow a thorough
state review of a given permit on the basis of Illinois law and
regulations, only to have the result nullified by the fiat of an EPA
regional administrator on his own interpretation of federal requirements, whereupon the whole process would start again in the
United States Court of Appeals.56 The Agency is now pressing the
Administrator to waive his veto power, as he is authorized to do.5"
EPA's Enforcement Procedures
Once an NPDES permit is issued, and no appeal is pending,
there remains the problem of enforcement. Detecting violations
is relatively easy because each permit contains detailed testing
and reporting requirements and to that extent is virtually selfenforcing. The Illinois Agency sends regular reports on each discharger to EPA quarterly, and in some instances monthly. EPA's
compliance branch analyzes these reports and if a probable violation is noted, it is referred to the EPA enforcement section for
review. Once again an attorney-engineer team reviews the case.
If a violation is apparent, EPA customarily checks with state
authorities to determine what action is being taken or planned.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1973).
56. Id. § 1369(b)(1).
57. Id. § 1342(d)(3).
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If, in EPA's judgment, the state response is inadequate EPA
may take the case to court.58
In water cases EPA can refer the matter directly to the United
States Attorney in the judicial district involved, with no need for
referral to EPA in Washington.59 He has the right to refuse the
case and EPA may proceed with its own attorneys, if it so
chooses."6 A permit violation case is relatively straightforward
because the discharger either has a permit or not, and if a permit
has been issued a water discharge can easily be measured against
it. The validity of the permit and the reasonableness of its conditions are not capable of challenge at this point. According to
EPA, they should have been challenged in an administrative proceeding at the time the permit was issued, or the underlying
effluent guidelines and water quality standards should have been
challenged within the appropriate time after enactment. Approximately 35 water enforcement cases have been referred by Region
V to litigation in fiscal year 1975, and several more have been
referred as of this writing.
Quite apart from EPA, the Illinois Agency has sought to bring
several water dischargers before the Board, alleging that the Illinois Act was also violated by their failure to have, or abide by the
terms of, an NPDES permit. The Board at first dismissed such
cases for want of jurisdiction,"' because Illinois lacks NPDES
permit-issuing authority. At this writing, however, the Board has
agreed to take a second look at the question in light of section
12(f) of the Illinois Act62 which can be read to apply even in the
63
absence of Illinois' NPDES authority.
THE AGENCY'S NEW BAG OF TRICKS

Enforcement of Illinois law and regulations by the Agency late
last year became affected with a conscious policy of prosecutorial
discretion. A suspected Violation may be uncovered from citizen
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
1975).

Id. § 1319(b).
Id. § 1366.
Id.
See, e.g., EPA v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., PCB #75-22 (August 28, 1975).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1., § 1012(f) (1973).
EPA v. Village of Springerton, PCB #75-337 (reconsideration granted October 30,
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complaints, reports from the facility itself, or the Agency's periodic inspections. Agency personnel are directed to report their
findings at a monthly enforcement meeting attended by an
Agency attorney and the Agency's manager for the affected region. Depending on the seriousness of the apparent violation one
of the following graduated enforcement steps may be taken, each
of which falls short of filing a formal complaint with the Board.
At the lowest level of response the regional manager may send
a form letter to the facility noting "apparent" violations and
offering the opportunity to verify, dispute or discuss the matter,
including a program of correction. If the matter is the subject of
a monthly enforcement meeting and the Agency attorney agrees
that one or more violations can be proven, a separate Agency file
is opened on the matter and, depending on the perceived attitude
of the facility management and its prior history, one of three
formal notices is sent.
The mildest notice is Form 3, "Notice of Compliance Conference," requesting representatives of the facility to attend a conference not less than 28 days from the date of notice to discuss
the validity of the alleged violations and a compliance program.
If the company appears with its attorney, Agency policy prevents
discussion of the matter further unless Agency attorneys are also
present. If the Notice of Compliance Conference does not suffice,
Agency officials in Springfield may cause either a Form 4 "Notice
of Violation," or a Form 5 "Enforcement Notice" to be issued.
These are official-looking documents bearing a caption, an EPA
docket number, and several paragraphs of simulated legal language commencing with "Now comes the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency. . . ." Each is signed by the manager of the
enforcement section and followed by a formal proof of service
form and notarization. The enforcement notice goes furthest,
carrying the additional signatures of the division manager and
the director, and promising that "AN ACTION WILL BE
PROMPTLY FILED AGAINST YOU, SEEKING SUCH CIVIL
OR CRIMINAL ORDERS AND PENALTIES AS PROVIDED
BY LAW." 64
64. Woe unto the bill collector who uses such tactics. See, e.g., William M. Libman,
t/a Better Business Service, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,376 (FTC
1968). See also 16 C.F.R. § 237.1 n.7 (1968).
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This compliance program has not been in operation long
enough for the Agency to ascertain its effectiveness, but its initial
estimates indicate that perhaps as many as 90 percent of all
apparent violations are corrected promptly, without the need of
formal action by the Board. The Agency justifiably takes credit
for achieving compliance and EPA could hardly care less that the
matter was resolved in a "station-house adjustment" type of procedure rather than having been launched into the ponderous and
time-consuming hearing procedures of an overworked and often
65
understaffed Board.
The Agency's use of prosecutorial discretion as part of its enforcement policy also fits into EPA's scheme for air pollution
enforcement. EPA has the authority to initiate its own enforcement procedures regardless of the activity of the appropriate state
agency. 6 Such procedures are required by statute to provide an
opportunity to confer concerning the alleged violation 7 and state
and local agencies having jurisdiction are invariably brought in.
The result is almost always an agreed order, usually consented to
and signed by not only the accused facility, but the state and
local authorities as well. Where the Agency has signed a compliance program approved by EPA there is hardly any point in
pursuing the same matter before the Board. The discharger is
subject to immediate EPA enforcement in the event that the
agreed order is violated.
The accused facility may still have at least a theoretical interest in bringing the Board's attention to its problem through a
variance petition to avoid the rather remote possibility of citizen
enforcement at the state level. While a citizen could also in theory
bring a case in the United States District Court to abate the
alleged violation and impose the statutory penalties,"s it defies
common experience to expect that the district court will impose
penalties or an abatement program different from that already
65. The Board has an authorized strength of five members. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
§ 1005(a) (1973). However, it has often been forced to limp along with less than full
membership, including a time in December, 1972 when it had less than a quorum due to
the resignation of Chairman Currie.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (1970).
67. Id. § 1857c-8(a)(4).
68. Id. § 1857h-2.
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agreed to by both EPA and the Agency and, most likely, the
applicable local authority as well.
THE BOARD'S NEW ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD

When the Board opened its doors for business in 1970 its horizons were limited only by the broad mandate of the Act to enact
and enforce a comprehensive set of regulations governing air and
water emissions, public water supplies, solid waste disposal, noise
and atomic regulation. In the five years that followed, the Board
has constantly encountered new limitations of federal preemption, and now is faced with the Agency's use of prosecutorial
discretion in lieu of variances. It thus finds itself working in a box
of ever decreasing dimensions. The Board's authority to regulate
radioactive discharges has been curtailed."5 It can enact air and
water regulations only if they are equal to or more stringent than
those set by EPA."0 The granting of operating permits for facilities
discharging into the waters of the state, which are now effectively
the waters of the United States,7 ' has been wholly preempted by
EPA and will be returned only when the Agency has obligated
itself to follow the EPA-determined guidelines, new source standards and procedural requirements. Even then, it is still subject
to EPA approval and the program can be withdrawn for cause."
To the extent that a discharger into Illinois waters exceeds
specific Illinois effluent standards, but meets the interim conditions of his NPDES permit, he effectively has a variance from
state regulations, at least until Illinois receives its own permit
issuing authority. Neither the Agency nor any citizen can complain that the discharger lacks a state permit, since the state has
no authority to issue permits other than NPDES. The Agency
69. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
70. National standards for new air emission sources are required by 42 U.S.C. § 1857c6 (1970); new source standards for water discharges are to be set under 33 U.S.C. § 1316
(Supp. 111, 1973); and guidelines for existing water sources are to be enacted under id. §
1314(b). Restrictions on motor vehicle standards are prohibited except for California
which can obtain a waiver to enforce standards more strict than those set by EPA. 42
U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(b) (1970).
71. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Train, 8 ERC 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. III, 1973).
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appears to only have retained a few scraps of its former power in
that it can issue construction permits for facilities which may
require NPDES permits, but for which such permits have not yet
been issued.73
In the area of air emissions the Board still retains its jurisdiction to find violations and exact the statutory penalties in cases
brought to it by the Agency or any citizen,7 4 but even this depends
on the initiative of either the Agency or a citizen to start the
proceeding. Citizen enforcement, while preserved and protected
by specific statutory authority in both the Illinois Act, the Clean
Air Act and FWPCA, is less a threat than it once appeared. Of
the 173 enforcement cases initiated before the Board in fiscal
1975, only 27, or about 20 percent, were at the behest of persons
other than the Agency.75 With virtually no investigatory or other
information gathering capability, citizens are at a great disadvantage in discovering violations which may not be detectable by
sight or smell. Even then a successful case may well depend upon
scientific proof of noncompliance, with a specific numerical standard which a citizen is ill-equipped to provide. The citizen's only
reasonably accessible source of information is the files of the
Agency itself" which in turn are almost always derived from the
discharger's own tests and reports.
If the Board's enforcement docket is diminishing, it can probably blame both the Agency and declining citizen interest for its
lack of business. It cannot, however, complain that the purpose
and intent of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act is being
deflected. The ultimate goal of compliance is apparently being
achieved through other means, particularly EPA's constant surveillance and readiness to assume the role of prosecutor if prompt
compliance is not forthcoming.
With regard to rule-making, one can sympathize with the
Board that subsequent federal activity has rendered moot many
73. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3 (Water Pollution), Rule
951.
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 '/2, § 1031(b) (1973).
75. 5 ILL. POLLUTION CONTROL BD. ANN. REP. (unpublished draft, 1975). In the prior year
only 132 cases were filed of which 25 percent were non-Agency. This marks the first net
increase in enforcement cases in the five years since the Board was formed.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 /2, § 1007(a) (1973).
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of the hours, days and even months spent in hearings, deliberations and drafting directed to the first comprehensive set of pollution control regulations and procedures ever put together by a
state government." Where Illinois regulations are more strict it
is clear that they will govern in any given situation, but the variance procedure for both air and water emissions has, for the moment, been effectively preempted by the informal working relationship currently enjoyed by the Agency and EPA. When and if
Illinois assumes NPDES authority the Board may yet have a
chance to assume most, if not all, of its former adjudicative authority.
The Board can blame itself for its loss of air variance business
by its refusal to consider air variance petitions without specific
allegations or proof that the requested variance will not conflict
with the principles of Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , namely, that the variance will not prevent or interfere
with the attainment or maintenance of national air quality standards. The Board has rejected as insufficient dozens of petitions
which did not contain such allegations." The Agency, on the
other hand, seems willing to play the game without approval of
each variance as part of the Illinois SIP. Such a variance would
then be a "state" variance and, at least arguably, entitled to
federal recognition through the previous federal approval of Illinois variance procedures, which were part of the original package
submitted and approved as Illinois' SIP.
It is painfully obvious that the federally mandated achievement of primary air quality standards within three years of the
approval of the Illinois SIP did not occur. Congress too seems to
have recognized this fact and the Clean Air Act stands a substantial chance of being materially changed in the current session.
Until this happens the petitioner for an air variance bears the
impossible burden of proving a negative; that his emission does
not contribute to the violation of an air quality standard which
77. Even more effort will be required in light of the recent amendments to the Illinois
Act requiring a separate economic analysis for each regulation, P. A. 79-790 (Sept. 5,
1975), amending-ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1027 (1973), and to require regulations
permitting intermittent control of sulfur oxide sources, P. A. 79-1099 (Sept. 26, 1975),
amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,§ 1010 (1973).
78. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
79. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co. v. EPA, #74-427, 16 PCB 581 (May 8, 1975).
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obviously is being violated, yet which may be violated anyway
whether or not the petitioner's variance is granted.
When Illinois is granted NPDES authority, and when the
Board again begins to consider air variance petitions without regard to the impossible standards of proof which it seems to have
drawn from Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,80
it will again be able to return to the important business of
minding the environment in Illinois.
80. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).

